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ABSTRACT
Proxy advisors have dramatically transformed 
shareholder voting. Traditionally, even large institutional 
investors tended to follow the Wall Street Rule—vote with 
management or sell your stock—because the economics did not 
justify incurring any expense in deciding how to vote. The 
emergence of proxy advisors who perform proxy research for a 
modest fee paid by each of thousands of institutions now 
enables these investors to vote intelligently. New laws and rules 
have also expanded the range of matters on which shareholders 
vote. Because of these developments, business managements can 
no longer ignore, but must cater to, shareholder interests.
However, corporate managers resent being dethroned. 
They have mounted a campaign to press the SEC to impose new 
regulations to hobble proxy advisors and, thereby, to neutralize 
institutional shareholders.
This Article reviews the charges leveled against proxy 
advisors and the new regulations proposed by their critics. It 
finds the complaints mostly unwarranted. Institutional investors 
are sophisticated and market forces minimize any problems with 
proxy advisors. With a few minor exceptions, new regulations 
are not needed and would be counterproductive.
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INTRODUCTION
Proxy advisory services have transformed proxy voting by 
institutional investors. These investors traditionally followed the 
Wall Street Rule—vote with management or sell.1 This practice 
made incumbent managers absolute monarchs of the companies. 
They could be challenged only in serious proxy fights, which 
insurgencies were (and still are) expensive and rare.2
Institutions followed the Wall Street Rule largely because they 
faced a collective action problem.3 It is expensive for a shareholder 
to research the merits of every proxy issue on which it votes. This is 
especially true for mutual funds that typically hold stock in over 100 
companies.4 If an institution pays the costs of that research, votes for 
the “right” side, and by so doing causes the “right” side to win and 
1. See Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not 
Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1430-31 (2002). For a discussion of the Wall 
Street Rule, see id. at 1430-34. See also Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s 
Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 261 (1962) 
(“[T]he modern shareholder . . . always votes ‘yes’ on the proxy.”).
2. One study a few years ago found that the average proxy fight costs the 
insurgent $10,710,000. Nikolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: 
Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 26-27), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1646471. Proxy 
contests are rare. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the 
Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 45-46 (2003) (empirical study finding that in a seven-year 
period from 1996-2002 only 215 proxy contests occurred). They seem to have 
increased more recently. See Warren S. de Wied, Proxy Contests, PRAC. L.J., Nov. 
2010, at 32, 33. “[M]ore than two-thirds of activists quit before making formal 
demands to their targets. . . . [O]nly 7% of the activist campaigns end up in a proxy 
fight.” Gantchev, supra (manuscript at 20).
3. Many institutional investors also have conflicts of interest that incline 
them to vote with management. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
4. An inquiry in 2004 found that the average equity fund holds stock in 
140 companies. Janice Revell, The Power of Concentration: Mutual Funds That Buy 
Fewer Stocks and Hold Them Longer Beat the Competition, FORTUNE (Aug. 23, 
2004), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/08/23/
379390/index.htm. Many large mutual funds have over 100,000 proxy questions to 
vote on each year. See JAMES K. GLASSMAN & J.W. VERRET, HOW TO FIX OUR 
BROKEN PROXY ADVISORY SYSTEM 8 (Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://mercatus.
org/sites/default/files/Glassman_ProxyAdvisorySystem_04152013.pdf.
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enhances the value of the company’s stock, other shareholders can 
“free-ride” on that effort; that is, the increase in value will be shared 
equally by stockholders who avoided the costs of the research.5
Investment companies that eschew these research expenses will have 
a competitive cost advantage. Thus, most institutions saved costs by 
following the Wall Street Rule, even though the result was 
suboptimal corporate performance and stock price.
In the 1990s, however, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
and a few other organizations appeared, offering for a fee to perform 
the research that most institutions shunned and to advise their clients 
of their findings. These services dramatically changed the cost–
benefit choices of institutional investors. At small cost they now 
could get objective, sophisticated, well-researched opinions about 
proxy issues. With most institutions using the service of a proxy 
advisor, votes against management became much more common.6
This change offends corporate executives; they want to seize 
back untrammeled power. They and their allies are waging a massive 
campaign to hobble the proxy advisors.7 Offering several complaints, 
they persuaded the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
5. See Ian D. Gow et al., Sneak Preview: How ISS Dictates Equity Plan 
Design, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Stanford, 
Cal.), Oct. 23, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2346401 (“In 
effect, proxy [voting] suffers from a ‘free-rider’ problem common to many voting 
situations.”).
6. For example, support for shareholder proposals has increased. See
Palmiter, supra note 1, at 1435.
7. The critics include SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher, see SEC 
Commissioner Comments on Proxy Adviser Practices, 16 Corp. Governance Rep. 
(BNA), at 19 (Feb. 4, 2013); Rep. Scott Garrett, Chairman of the House Financial 
Services Capital Markets Subcommittee, see Richard Hill, Rep. Garrett Urges SEC 
to Act, in Limited Capacity, on Proxy Adviser Issues, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA), at 1925 (Oct. 21, 2013); former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, see Yin 
Wilczek, SEC, to Mitigate Proxy Advisers’ Influence, Should Repeal 2004 No-Act 
Letters, Pitt Says, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 2277 (Dec. 17, 2012) 
[hereinafter Wilczek, SEC to Mitigate]; and the NASDAQ Stock Market, see Yin 
Wilczek, Nasdaq Petitions SEC to Require Proxy Firms to Publicly Disclose 
Methodologies, Conflicts, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1927 (Oct. 21, 2013) 
[hereinafter Wilczek, Nasdaq Petitions SEC].
Proxy advisors have also come under attack in Europe, see Nigel 
Banerjee, Institutional Shareholders’ Use of Proxy Advisers–Outsourcing 
Stewardship?, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1646 (Sept. 3, 2012), and in 
Canada, see Yvan Allaire, The Troubling Case of Proxy Advisors: Some Policy 
Recommendations 11 (Inst. for Governance of Private & Pub. Orgs., Policy Paper 
No. 7, 2013), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2282617.
1290 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1287
review the proxy advisory industry and consider new regulation.8
One influential Congressman has said that if the SEC does not 
further regulate proxy advisors, Congress will.9
This Article analyzes the campaign against proxy advisors. Part 
I describes how proxy advisors work and how influential they are. 
Part II reviews charges that institutional investors have improperly 
delegated to proxy advisors their fiduciary duty to vote their shares 
with due care. Part III discusses the claim that ISS holds a damaging 
monopoly over proxy advisory services. Part IV considers the 
allegations that proxy advisors make many factual errors, that their 
activities lack transparency, and that their policies are misguided. 
Part V examines arguments that proxy advisors should be deemed 
fiduciaries for their clients and that they have conflicts of interest 
that should be regulated or prohibited. Part VI weighs other 
proposals to regulate proxy advisors.
I. THE FUNCTIONS AND INFLUENCE OF PROXY ADVISORY SERVICES
The biggest proxy advisor is Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS), which is owned by Vestar Capital Partners.10 At the end of 
2009, it had 2,970 clients,11 more than all other proxy advisors 
combined.12 ISS also performs two other services. It publishes 
corporate governance ratings for thousands of public companies that 
are used by some investors as indicia of the quality of a company’s 
corporate governance.13 Several other firms also issue corporate 
8. See generally Proxy Advisory Firms Roundtable (Dec. 5, 2013) 
[hereinafter Proxy Roundtable], available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxy-
advisory-services/proxy-advisory-services-transcript.txt.
9. See Hill, supra note 7, at 1925. 
10. In 2014, Vestar purchased ISS from RiskMetrics, Inc. See Vestar 
Capital Partners Completes Acquisition of Institutional Shareholder Services,
INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES INC. (Apr. 30, 2014), 
http://www.issgovernance.com/vestar-capital-partners-completes-acquisition-of-
institutional-shareholder-services/.
11. RiskMetrics Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Feb. 24, 2010).
12. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-765, CORPORATE 
SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: ISSUES RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING 13 (2007) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
13. See RiskMetrics Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 13 (Mar. 31, 
2008).
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governance ratings.14 ISS also offers corporate governance advisory 
services to public companies.15
The second largest proxy advisor is Glass, Lewis & Co. ISS 
and Glass Lewis together have over 90% of the proxy advisor 
market.16 Glass Lewis has grown and by 2011 had over 40% of the 
market.17
The potential influence of proxy advisors is considerable. As of 
2007, investment funds alone owned about 24% of publicly traded 
American corporate stock, and this figure has been rising constantly 
for decades.18 There is disagreement about how influential proxy 
advisors actually are. Some claim that ISS alone controls one-third or 
more of the shareholder votes of many issuers.19 However, one study 
found that ISS recommendations swayed only 6% to 10% of the 
institutional votes.20
14. See Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate 
Governance Industry: The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 384, 391 (2009).
15. Id. 
16. See CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY 
ADVISORY INDUSTRY STATUS QUO: THE CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
OVERSIGHT 3 (2011) [hereinafter CALL FOR CHANGE], available at
http://www.execcomp.org/docs/c11-
07a%20Proxy%20Advisory%20White%20Paper%20_FULL%20COLOR_.pdf (ISS 
“controls the market, with a 61% market share, and . . . Glass, Lewis & Co. controls 
approximately 37% of the market” (footnote omitted)).
17. See TAO LI, OUTSOURCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST AND COMPETITION IN THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY 4, 35 fig.1 (2013), 
available at http://www.columbia.edu/~tl2157/Tao_Li_Proxy_Advisors_Conflicts_
Competition.pdf.
18. See INV. CO. INST., 2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 10 fig.1.2, 
11 fig.1.4 (48th ed. 2008), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2008_factbook.pdf.
Institutional investors now own over 70% of the stock of the largest 1,000 American 
corporations. Asaf Eckstein, Great Expectations: The Peril of an Expectations Gap 
in Proxy Advisory Firm Regulation, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 11), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2469158.
19. See Dean Starkman, A Proxy Adviser’s Two Sides: Some Question Work 
of ISS for Companies It Scrutinizes, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2006), 
http://www.hrpolicy.org/downloads/2006/WashPost_ISS_ProxyAdvisor_012306.pd
f (paraphrasing Susan E. Wolf, former Vice President and Corporate Secretary of 
Schering-Plough and former Chairman of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and 
Governance Professionals).
20. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy 
Advisors: Myth Or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 869, 906 (2010) [hereinafter Choi, 
Fisch & Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors]. A more recent study by the same 
authors also finds “a substantial degree of divergence [in voting by mutual funds] 
from ISS recommendations, refuting the claim that most funds follow ISS blindly.” 
Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds 
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These widely divergent figures reflect the difficulty of 
distinguishing statistical correlation from causation. ISS is not the 
sole public voice on proxy issues.21 Some institutions employ more 
than one proxy advisor.22 Many large institutions rely more on their 
in-house proxy analysts than they do on ISS.23 Some non-profit 
organizations offer proxy voting advice.24 Shareholder proposals 
come with their own supporting statements by the proponent. And, 
of course, managements propagate their own views through the 
company proxy statement and other forms of proxy solicitation.
When ISS agrees with others, it is impossible to say that ISS 
“caused” the votes consistent with its advice. An institution may 
choose a proxy advisor whose philosophy it shares.25 There is “a
substantial correlation between proxy advisor recommendations and 
the factors that academics, policy makers, and the media have 
identified as important.”26 Thus, there are usually several vectors 
pushing in the same direction as proxy advisors’ recommendations. 
Arguably, then, “the proxy firms’ positions essentially mirror the 
Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 39 (2013) [hereinafter Choi, 
Fisch & Kahan, Who Calls the Shots?]; see also Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, The 
Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Continuity Design 4
(Nov. 18, 2014), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2526799 (finding that 
“a negative recommendation from ISS leads to an about 25 percentage point 
decrease in voting support for say-on-pay proposals”).
21. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
22. See Letter from Jonathan Feigelson, Senior Vice President, Gen. 
Counsel & Head of Corporate Governance, Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. 
& Coll. Ret. Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Nov. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from TIAA-CREF], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-263.pdf (“TIAA-CREF 
subscribes to the corporate governance research publications of several firms . . . .”). 
23. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
24. For example, the Sustainable Investments Institute is a non-profit 
organization that offers advice on proxy resolutions concerning “social and 
environmental issues.” See Mission, SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS INST.,
http://www.siinstitute.org/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
25. See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors, supra note 20,
at 879.
26. Id. at 881. Similarly, in 2010 ISS recommended “‘against’” “28 out of 
136 management-sponsored say-on-pay proposals[,] . . . [but o]nly three of the 
28 . . . failed to pass.” E-mail from Glenn Davis, Senior Research Assoc., Council of 
Institutional Investors, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Oct. 14, 2010) [hereinafter E-mail from Council of Institutional Investors], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-80.pdf.
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current consensus on good governance.”27 Not surprisingly, mutual 
funds “tend to support proposals which are likely to positively 
impact shareholder wealth.”28 In recent years the influence of proxy 
advisors seems to have declined.29
Also, altering some shareholders’ votes does not mean that 
proxy advisors dictate the success or failure of a resolution. In 2012, 
ISS and Glass Lewis recommended voting against about 14% of say-
on-pay resolutions, but just 2.7% of say-on-pay votes failed.30 And 
these votes are only precatory. If a board likes its pay plan despite a 
negative shareholder vote, it can still implement the plan and explain 
its decision to the world.31
Moreover, statistical analyses do not distinguish between 
important and minor proxy issues. Because of the huge volume of 
issues on which institutions vote, some institutions use proxy 
advisors primarily to identify issues that deserve special attention.32
27. ROBYN BEW & RICHARD FIELDS, TAPESTRY NETWORKS, VOTING 
DECISIONS AT U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS: HOW INVESTORS REALLY USE PROXY ADVISERS
9 (2012), available at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Voting_Decisions_at%20US_
Mutual_Funds.pdf; see also Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, 
Understanding Director Elections: Determinants and Consequences 3-4, 35 (June 9, 
2014), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2447920 (study finding 
“substantial variations” in “withhold” votes in board elections “conditional on the 
underlying reason” for ISS’s “withhold” recommendation).
28. Angela Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from 
Mutual Fund Voting, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 914, 927 (2011).
29. Reena Aggarwal, Isil Erel & Laura Starks, Influence of Public Opinion 
on Investor Voting and Proxy Advisors 4-5, 13-14 (Georgetown Univ. McDonough 
Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2447012, 2014), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2447012. 
30. See Stephen Joyce, Say-on-Pay Votes Change, Enhance Role of Proxy 
Advisory Firms, Many Agree, 44 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1305 (July 2, 2012) 
[hereinafter Joyce, Say-on-Pay Votes Change Role] (citing data from Semler Brossy 
Consulting Group LLC). Similar figures have been observed for 2011. See BEW &
FIELDS, supra note 27, at 10. A say-on-pay vote is a vote by shareholders of a public 
company on whether to approve the company’s executive compensation plan. This 
vote is required by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act § 951. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)). This law stipulates that the shareholder vote is only 
advisory. Id.
31. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951. 
However, even a substantial minority vote may influence a board to make changes. 
See Ertimur et al., supra note 27, at 5-6, 35 (study finding that boards often make 
changes in response to a high “withhold” vote in director elections).
32. See Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-
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Institutions rely less on proxy advisors with respect to “certain high-
profile or controversial proxy issues, such as mergers and 
acquisitions or executive compensation.”33 Thus, the influence of 
proxy advisors seems to be greatest where it is least important.
Several independent outside observers have found that the 
overall influence of proxy advisors is not great. A General 
Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded “that the overall 
influence of advisory firms on proxy vote outcomes may be 
limited.”34 An empirical study found that the influence of ISS is 
exaggerated and that “proxy advisors act primarily as agents or 
intermediaries which aggregate information that investors find 
important in determining how to vote in director elections rather than 
as independent power centers.”35 Another study found that “reliance 
on management appears to be more significant than reliance on 
ISS.”36
shareholding-giant-is-quietly-stirring.html?pagewanted-all&_r=0 (stating that 
BlackRock “uses the advisory services I.S.S. and Glass, Lewis & Company to help 
summarize proxy statements. Once those services have identified an issue, 
BlackRock assigns an analyst to it”).
33. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 17; see also infra notes 79-82 and 
accompanying text.
34. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 17.
35. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and 
the Influence of Proxy Advisors 51-52 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., 
Working Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1127282; see 
also BEW & FIELDS, supra note 27, at 2, 13 (stating that proxy advisors are valued 
by institutions as “data aggregators”). A proxy advisor also makes information 
easier for the investor to absorb by presenting it in a common format for all issuers. 
See Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 150 (citing remarks of Michael Ryan, Vice 
President, Business Roundtable, stating that proxy advisors “take and distill the 
information” and “standardize the ability to read” it); see also id. at 63 (citing 
remarks of Damon Silvers, Director of Policy and Special Counsel, AFL-CIO, 
stating that proxy advisors “produce extremely detailed analyses of things that in 
many cases have been essentially rendered intentionally obscure in the proxy 
process”).
36. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Who Calls the Shots?, supra note 20, at 67; see 
also Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd–Frank’s Say on 
Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1247 (2012) (“For management-sponsored say-on-pay 
proposals, what is striking is that shareholders are more than twice as likely to 
follow management’s recommendation than they are ISS’s recommendation when 
the two recommendations differ.”). Another study found that the “against” vote in 
say-on-pay resolutions averaged 6.7% when ISS recommended a vote for the 
resolution and 34.9% when ISS recommended a “no” vote. James F. Cotter, Alan R. 
Palmiter & Randall S. Thomas, The First Year of Say-on-Pay Under Dodd–Frank: 
An Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967, 983 (2013). 
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However, the influence of proxy advisors may extend beyond 
their impact on proxy votes. In order to get favorable 
recommendations on proxy votes and positive corporate governance 
ratings, many public companies tailor their executive compensation 
schemes, responses to shareholder proposals, and corporate 
governance practices to the standards of the leading proxy advisors.37
This influence cannot be measured precisely, but it may be largely 
the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy. In an effort to convince the 
SEC to hobble proxy advisors with regulation, corporate executives 
and their minions have trafficked inflated estimates of the advisors’ 
influence. Ironically, many of these people seem to have been fooled 
by their own propaganda and kowtow to ISS more than they need 
to.38
That may not be a bad thing. Corporations may improve their 
performance by adopting the views of proxy advisors even if they 
need not do so to gain shareholder approval. Moreover, the rise of 
proxy advisors and hedge funds has forced corporations to change 
their attitudes toward their large shareholders. Formerly these 
investors got no attention from management beyond the press 
releases available to everyone. Now managers actively seek out 
major shareholders so as to solicit their views and explain 
managements’ conduct.39
In any case, it would make no sense to increase regulation of 
proxy advisors just because some people mistakenly believe that 
advisors wield great influence. The evidence that the influence of 
It is impossible to say how much influence ISS exerted, however, because ISS’s 
recommendations are not random but are based on the contents of the proposed pay 
plan and on the performance of the company. Id. at 984, 989-90. It is impossible to 
say how much “against” votes are induced by these factors and how much they are 
independently influenced by ISS’s recommendations. Id. Of the 173 resolutions on 
which ISS recommended a “no” vote, 142 (82.1%) still received a majority “for” 
vote. Id. at 983. Thus, management recommendations prevailed overwhelmingly 
even in the face of a contrary ISS recommendation.
37. See LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
COMMENTARY: PROXY ADVISORY BUSINESS: APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE? 2 (2011) 
[hereinafter APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?], available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pub
Content/_pdf/pub4042_1.pdf.
38. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 21 (recognizing that proxy 
advisors may be influential simply because issuers think they are influential).
39. See David Gelles, Unlikely Allies Seek to Check Power of Activist 
Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2014, 10:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/02/02/unlikely-allies-seek-to-check-power-of-activist-hedge-funds/ (reporting 
formation of the Shareholder-Director Exchange to promote communication 
between corporations and shareholders).
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proxy advisors is modest does not necessarily mean that no change is 
called for, but it does counsel caution toward managers’ cries of 
alarm and demands for drastic action.
II. IMPROPER DELEGATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Investment advisors are fiduciaries. Fiduciaries may seek 
expert advice, but they cannot delegate their decision making to 
others.40 Critics charge that many institutional investors have 
improperly delegated their proxy-voting decisions to their proxy 
advisors.41 They add that the SEC has abetted this problem by 
requiring asset managers to vote proxies they hold in the best 
interests of their clients,42 but allowing them to rely on proxy 
advisors to discharge that duty.43 They urge the SEC either to retract 
the requirement to vote proxies (so that institutions could abstain) or 
to declare that reliance on a proxy advisor is not enough to satisfy an 
institution’s fiduciary duty in proxy voting.44
40. With some exceptions, “a fiduciary is not to delegate the performance 
of matters involving the exercise of discretion.” WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF 
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 22 (3d ed. 2001).
41. See Policymakers, Regulators Must Question Role of Proxy Advisory 
Firms, Gallagher Says, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 977 (May 27, 2013) 
[hereinafter Policymakers Must Question] (quoting SEC Commissioner Daniel 
Gallagher as criticizing institutional investors for “‘over-relying on analyses by 
proxy advisory firms’” and saying “‘[n]o one should be able to outsource their 
fiduciary duties’”); Wilczek, SEC to Mitigate, supra note 7, at 2277 (paraphrasing 
former SEC chairman Harvey Pitt as saying that there is “an environment in which 
portfolio managers believe they can ‘outsource’ their voting responsibilities”).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2012). This duty has been made explicit with 
respect to employee benefit plans. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-3 (2012). The SEC also 
adopted a rule that requires investment advisors to vote proxies in the best interests 
of their clients and to disclose their voting policies and voting records. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.206(4)-6.
43. The source for this claim is two “no-action” letters from the SEC. Egan-
Jones Proxy Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 636 (May 27, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/egan052704
.htm (stating that an investment adviser may avoid a charge of conflict of interest by 
relying on the advice of a proxy advisor); Institutional Shareholder Servs., Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 736 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/iss091504.htm (stating that in 
fulfilling its fiduciary duty in proxy voting an investment advisor may review a 
proxy advisor’s overall conflict of interest procedures rather than perform a case-by-
case analysis).
44. Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 920 
(2007); Wilczek, SEC to Mitigate, supra note 7, at 2278 (citing former SEC 
Chairman Harvey Pitt as suggesting “that the SEC embrace a set of core principles 
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Fifteen to twenty percent of mutual funds have authorized ISS 
to vote their shares.45 Others have an announced policy of generally 
following advisor recommendations.46 However, each institution 
retains ultimate control over its voting; it may withdraw authority 
from ISS in individual cases or rescind its authority completely.47
Every fiduciary is free to rely on experts so long as the 
fiduciary makes the ultimate decision. Thus, the SEC statements 
allowing asset managers to rely on proxy advisors did not confer any 
new permission. Directors of corporations (including investment 
companies) are not required or expected to be experts in all aspects 
of their business.48 They must follow expert advice in the many areas 
that require special expertise. Boards do not fashion corporate 
business strategy from scratch; they assign certain agents—the 
company’s executives—to draft a business plan, which the board 
reviews and, typically, approves.49
It would be impractical and negligent for the board of any 
institution that holds stock in several public companies to discuss 
and resolve at a board meeting every proxy resolution that the 
institution faces. Directors have neither the time nor the expertise to 
do that; they need expert advice. The experts may be company 
that clearly articulates the [proxy voting] responsibilities” of portfolio managers, but 
not stating what those principles should be); see also Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 
430 (seeming to agree with this recommendation); Policymakers Must Question,
supra note 41, at 977 (citing SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher as urging the 
SEC to take unspecified steps “‘to ensure that advisers to institutional investors . . . 
are not over-relying on analyses by proxy advisory firms’”).
45. See Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 386. In addition, “[m]any institutional 
investors vote in lockstep with the recommendations of proxy advisory firms.” Gow, 
supra note 5, at 1, 5 exh. 1. These tend to be the smaller funds. Larger funds rely 
more on internal staffs and often have “client-specific custom policies.” See infra
notes 67-68, 81 and accompanying text.
46. See Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 410-11 (giving examples).
47. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 16-17 (“[W]hether large or small, 
all of the institutional investors we spoke with explained that they retain the 
fiduciary obligation to vote proxies in the best interest of their clients irrespective of 
their reliance on proxy advisory firms.”).
48. Delaware courts will not even ask whether a director’s decision was 
reasonable much less whether the directors possessed some degree of skill. See infra
notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
49. See Miriam Schwartz-Ziv & Michael S. Weisbach, What Do Boards 
Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 349, 350 
(2013) (finding that boards receive proposals from the CEO; that 99% of the time 
they receive only one option; and that they disagree with the CEO only 2.5% of the 
time).
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employees or outsiders.50 Indeed, one of the most fundamental tasks 
of any board is to decide what functions the company will perform 
in-house and which will be outsourced.51 Economists call this the 
“make or buy” decision.52 There is no reason why proxy voting 
should be singled out and excluded from the directors’ general right 
to rely on experts.
Corporate executives and their allies routinely insist that 
directors be allowed to act with minimal interference from courts or 
administrative agencies. These groups have never complained when 
institutional investors followed the Wall Street Rule and 
automatically voted with management. Thus it is suspicious that they 
call for restricting boards’ right to rely on experts only when it is 
reliance on proxy advisors.
For proxy voting, the advantages of using an outsider are 
obvious. The primary goal of institutional investors is to maximize 
the value of their portfolios.53 It makes economic sense to pay a third 
party a small fee (which is also charged to many other investors 
holding the same stock) to research whether each proxy resolution 
serves that goal rather than to incur the expense of doing that 
research in-house. Moreover, similar proxy resolutions, like those 
relating to executive compensation, arise at hundreds of publicly 
traded companies. A single institution may hold stock in just a few 
companies with a particular proxy issue, so it might not make 
economic sense for it to research that issue extensively, especially if 
50. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2014) (creating a right of directors 
to rely on “any of the corporation’s officers or employees, or committees of the 
board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the member reasonably 
believes are within such other person’s professional or expert competence and who 
has been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation”).
51. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-95
(1937).
52. Ronald Coase first framed the theory of the firm based on the 
distinction between which functions were more economically performed within the 
entity and which were better contracted for in the market, which was later coined the 
“make or buy decision.” See id. 
53. Some institutional investors, like union pension funds, may also have 
social or political goals. See JAMES R. COPLAND & MARGARET M. O’KEEFE,
MANHATTAN INST., PROXY MONITOR 2013: A REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 2 (2013), available at http://www.proxymonitor.org/
pdf/pmr_06.pdf. However, these investors are exceptions. See George W. Dent, Jr., 
The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 106-09 (2010).
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it is a small institutional investor.54 However, for ISS, which 
researches hundreds of issuers with resolutions on a given subject, it 
makes excellent sense to develop expertise on that subject.
The need for outside expertise is much greater now than it was 
just twenty years ago. By giving shareholders a say-on-pay, the 
Dodd–Frank Act requires them to vote on detailed compensation 
plans, something that was almost never submitted to shareholders 
before.55 Also, twenty years ago shareholder resolutions on corporate 
governance almost never passed, so an institutional investor might 
have deemed it unimportant how it voted on these matters. Now, 
such resolutions are usually hotly contested and often pass.56 Until 
54. “Without proxy advisers, many pension plans—particularly smaller 
funds with limited resources—would have difficulty managing their highly seasonal 
proxy voting responsibilities for the thousands of companies in their portfolios.” E-
mail from Council of Institutional Investors, supra note 26. For this reason it is not 
surprising that large institutions report that they rely less on proxy advisors’ 
recommendations than do smaller institutions. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 
5-6; BEW & FIELDS, supra note 27, at 15. Index funds seem also to rely more heavily 
on proxy advisors. Id. This is not surprising because index funds compete by 
“keep[ing] expenses as low as possible.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate 
Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible 
Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1082-83 (2008).
55. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)). This rule covers about 7,300 public companies. See
APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 2-3.
56. The number of successful shareholder proposals fell from fifty-three 
(15% of the total) in 2006 to fourteen (6% of the total) in 2012. JAMES R. COPLAND,
YEVGENIY FEYMAN & MARGARET O’KEEFE, MANHATTAN INST., PROXY MONITOR 
2012: A REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 17 
(2012), available at http://www.proxymonitor.org/pdf/pmr_04.pdf. 
The key reason for this overall downward trend appears to be a shift from 
more popular proposals to less appealing ideas. . . . As [the more popular] 
ideas have been adopted, . . . they are less likely to be the subject of 
shareholder proposals, for the simple reason that they are no longer 
relevant for many companies. 
Id. at 18. It is also likely that issuers have become more sophisticated in dealing with 
shareholder dissatisfaction and shareholder proposals. For example, many issuers 
admit to adopting ISS’s guidelines on executive compensation. See supra note 37
and accompanying text. Such behavior reduces the chances that an issuer will face a 
serious shareholder challenge. Moreover, many companies that do receive a serious 
challenge either concede without a fight or compromise with the proponents. For
example, shareholders dislike staggered boards of directors, but they alone cannot 
change them in Delaware because provisions for staggered boards are contained in 
the charter, which cannot be amended without a positive vote of both the board and 
the shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(d), 242(b) (2014). Nonetheless, 
ninety-seven companies that received proposals in 2012–2013 to de-stagger their 
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recently, nearly all American corporations had plurality voting for 
the board of directors. Except in the rare case of a serious proxy 
contest, election of the company’s official slate of nominees was 
automatic, so institutions might have thought it irrelevant how they 
voted. Now, most corporations have majority voting, and it is not 
uncommon for official candidates to fail to get a majority vote.57
Also, SEC regulations now require issuers to disclose more 
information, which increases the burden of researching proxy 
issues.58
The results of all these changes are that shareholders are now 
asked to vote on more issues than before, disclosures are more 
complex, and more issues are seriously contested so that an 
institution’s vote is now more likely to make a difference.59 These 
changes would drastically increase costs to institutional investors if 
they had to perform all research in-house.60 Use of a proxy advisor is 
far wiser.
To follow anyone’s advice unthinkingly would be an improper 
delegation of a fiduciary’s duty, but that is not what institutions have
done with proxy voting.61 First, an advisor is not chosen at random. 
boards (about three-quarters of such companies) agreed to move to annual elections 
after receiving declassification proposals. June Rhee, The Shareholder Rights 
Project’s Mid-Year Update, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(July 10, 2013, 9:34 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/07/10/the-
shareholder-rights-projects-mid-year-update/. Evidently these issuers have bowed to 
the power of shareholders. Thus the declining success rate of proposals does not 
seem to evidence declining shareholder influence. See id.
57. See Sarah Johnson, In the Minority on Majority Voting, CFO (Jan. 27, 
2011), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14552148?=rsspage (“Nearly 70% of S&P 
500 companies now have a majority-voting standard . . . .”). However, boards often 
ignore such failures and leave the director in place. See James B. Stewart, Bad 
Directors and Why They Aren’t Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/business/why-bad-directors-arent-thrown-
out.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Of the 61 directors who failed to get majority 
approval [in 2012], only six actually stepped down or were asked to resign. Fifty-
one are still in place, as of the most recent proxy filings.”).
58. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 5.
59. Id. at 17.
60. TIAA-CREF manages $840 billion in Assets. See Who We Are, TIAA-
CREF, https://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/about-us/who-we-are-at-tiaa-cref (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2014). It says: “Though we dedicate a significant amount of 
resources to corporate governance research and the voting of proxies, we still would 
have difficulty processing the 80,000 plus unique agenda items voted by our staff 
annually without utilizing this research [or proxy advisers].” Letter from TIAA-
CREF, supra note 22.
61. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
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Instead, most institutional investors “determine which proxy advisor 
has a voting policy they most agree with.”62 To the extent that 
institutions vote with ISS and Glass Lewis it is because they “have 
some common views on corporate governance.”63
Some institutions also subscribe to more than one proxy 
advisory firm and consider the recommendations of all of them.64
Advisors publicize their general policies and specific 
recommendations.65 Sometimes they disagree among themselves.66
Many institutions (especially the larger ones) maintain internal staffs 
to research proxy issues, and they often reject the advice of a proxy 
advisor and follow the contrary recommendations of their own 
staffs.67
Over 400 institutions do not accept the standard voting 
recommendations of a proxy advisor but have “client-specific 
custom policies” that are “implemented on behalf of clients tailored 
to their investment philosophies” and which together total over “50
percent of ballots that flow through ISS’ voting system.”68 ISS also 
considers the views of investors in formulating its policies.69 This is 
62. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors, supra note 20, at 
883.
63. Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 54 (citing remarks of Lynn Turner,
Managing Director, LitNomics, Inc.). 
64. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 15 (reporting that eight of twenty 
institutions interviewed followed this practice).
65. See generally, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC., U.S.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY: 2013 UPDATES (2012) [hereinafter 2013
UPDATES], available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2013USPolicyUpdates.
pdf.
66. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections 
and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 649 (2009) (finding that 
“the four proxy advisory firms differ substantially from each other in their 
willingness to issue a withhold recommendation”).
67. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 16 (stating that fifteen of twenty 
large institutions interviewed by the GAO “reported that they generally rely more on 
their own in-house research and analyses to make voting decisions than on the 
research and recommendations provided by their proxy advisory services”); see also
Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 53 (citing remarks of Lynn Turner, Manager 
Director, LitiNomics, Inc., stating that her institution voted against management 
more often than Glass Lewis so recommended).
68. PATRICK MCGURN ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. INC.,
TWELVE FOR 2012: NOTABLE CHANGES TO THE ISS BENCHMARK VOTING POLICY FOR 
THE UPCOMING PROXY SEASON 3 (2012), available at
http://www.issgovernance.com/files/2012USPoliciesUpdatesWebcastSlidePresentati
on.pdf.
69. Id. at 2 (citing 335 investor responses to an ISS survey and six 
roundtable discussions).
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hardly surprising. ISS is a business; it has no reason to pursue an 
independent agenda and every reason to please its customers.
More important, although ISS and Glass Lewis may dominate 
among proxy advisors, proxy advisors are far from the sole voices on 
proxy issues. For many institutions, the recommendations of a proxy 
advisor are just “one of many inputs” in deciding how to vote.70
Public pension funds are vocal shareholders.71 Four public pension 
funds and one foundation work with the Shareholders Rights Project 
(SRP) at Harvard Law School on certain issues relating to corporate 
governance.72 The SRP not only provides an alternative source of 
advice for the institutions that work with it, but also publicizes its 
views for other institutions to consider. Some large institutions 
publish in advance their own positions on proxy issues.73 Other 
institutions are free to adopt these positions.
The funds working with SRP submitted seventy-six 
shareholder resolutions in 201374 and eighty-nine in 201275 to 
declassify boards. ISS generally supports these resolutions. 
However, managements often spend considerable sums from the 
corporate treasury in efforts (including direct solicitation of 
institutional investors) to curry support for their recommendations.76
70. Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 45 (citing remarks of Michelle 
Edkins, Managing Director and Global Head, Corporate Governance and 
Responsible Investment, BlackRock, Inc.).
71. See Public Pension Funds Increasingly Active as Shareholders in 2013 
Proxy Season, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1003 (May 27, 2013) [hereinafter 
Public Funds Active].
72. See SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, http://srp.law.harvard.edu/index.shtml 
(last visited Nov. 22, 2014) (describing the Shareholder Rights Project and listing 
the funds represented by the SRP).
73. See Public Funds Active, supra note 71, at 1007 (“For the 2013 proxy 
season, CalPERS [the California Public Employees’ Retirement System] will be 
disclosing its proxy votes for 376 companies in advance of their annual meeting 
dates. The information is posted on the CalPERS website.”).
74. 2013 Proposals by SRP-Represented Investors, SHAREHOLDER RTS.
PROJECT, http://www.srp.harvard.edu/2013-declassification-proposals.shtml (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2014).
75. Outcomes of 2012 Proposals by SRP-Represented Investors,
SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/2012-declassification-
proposals.shtml (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
76. See Aaron Lucchetti, Companies Fight Back on Executive Pay, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748
703989504576128350414836400 (describing lobbying efforts directed at 100 large 
institutional investors by the Center on Executive Compensation, an organization 
created by several large public companies); BEW & FIELDS, supra note 27, at 18 
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Public corporations also collaborate in various ways to publicize 
their views. Several organizations funded by public corporations 
(like the Business Roundtable and the Center on Executive 
Compensation) routinely release statements on proxy issues, 
including direct criticisms of proxy advisors.77 By contrast, proxy 
challengers must fund their campaigns out of their own pockets. As a 
result, only thirty-nine of SRP’s resolutions were approved by 
shareholders in 2012, and nineteen were carried in 2013.78 These 
results do not indicate that institutional investors are blindly 
following proxy advisors—or anyone else—in their proxy voting.
“In addition, large and small institutional investors reported 
that they tend to provide greater in-house scrutiny to, and rely even 
less on, proxy advisory firm recommendations about certain high-
profile or controversial proxy issues, such as mergers and 
acquisitions or executive compensation.”79 Even those who allege 
undue reliance by institutions on proxy advisors tend to acknowledge 
an exception “for votes with clear economic significance (such as 
mergers or election contests).”80 Thus, institutions’ reliance on proxy 
advisors may be significant primarily for smaller institutions81 and in 
fairly routine and uncontested matters.82
Some have expressed skepticism about “institutional investors’
insistence that they make independent decisions notwithstanding 
ISS’s influence. Yes, some do. But how many institutional investors 
would actually confess . . . ‘Yep, most of the time I just vote the way 
(quoting one asset manager as saying, “‘We talked to about 400 issuers last year 
about compensation’”).
77. See generally, e.g., CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16.
78. See SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT, supra note 72. ISS “supports annual 
director elections rather than a classified board structure.” INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER 
SERVS. INC., 2013 SRI U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 45 (2013), available at
http://www.issgovernance.com/file/2013-policies/2013ISSSRIUSPolicy.pdf. 
79. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 17; see also Proxy Roundtable, supra
note 8, at 152 (quoting remarks of Eric Komitee, General Counsel, Viking Global 
Investors, GP, saying, “the more contested the vote is the less likely we are to be 
swayed in the end one way or another by what the proxy advisor is 
recommending”).
80. LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMMENTARY:
THE PARALLEL UNIVERSES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING AND INSTITUTIONAL VOTING
1 (2010), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub3446_1.pdf.
81. See Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 56 (quoting remarks of Karen 
Barr, General Counsel, Investment Adviser Association, saying, “Smaller 
[investment] advisors tend to rely more heavily on the research and 
recommendations of proxy advisory firms”).
82. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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they tell me.’”83 However, the professionals interviewed by the GAO 
agreed “that large institutional investors would be likely to use proxy 
advisory firms as one of several factors they consider in the research 
and analysis they perform.”84 “The influence of ISS is thus mostly 
due to funds’ measured evaluation of the ISS recommendations, with 
significant thinking on their own, rather than to funds’ blindly 
following these recommendations.”85
Restricting the use of proxy advisors by institutional investors 
would have several negative consequences. Probably no fund would 
respond by creating a large in-house staff to research all proxy 
issues; that is not economically practicable.86 If proxy advisors have 
been compelled to “automate their decision-making processes” by 
the “sheer volume of shareholder votes,”87 even the largest 
institutional investors could not hope to study every voting decision. 
Rather, most institutions (especially the smaller ones) would revert 
to their former practices—generally following the Wall Street Rule 
by voting for management.88 The result would not be more 
independent evaluation of proxy issues by institutional investors but 
delegation of decisions by default to the issuer’s management. Of 
course, this is probably just the result that the foes of proxy advisors 
want.
If institutions were forced to handle proxy voting in-house,89
they would reduce diversification of their portfolios because fewer 
83. Broc Romanek, GAO Report on Proxy Advisors: No Smoking Guns,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 3, 2007, 7:36 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2007/08/03/gao-report-on-proxy-advisors-no-
smoking-gun.
84. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 17.
85. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Voting Through Agents: 
How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections 9 (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law & 
Econ., Research Paper No. 11-28, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912772.
86. Romanek, supra note 83 (“The reality is that institutional investors are 
trying to keep their expense ratios down–and even the larger institutions typically 
have only a few employees dedicated to vetting voting issues.”).
87. See APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 1.
88. “[T]he impetus for enacting the SEC 2003 Rule [regarding proxy voting 
by mutual funds] was a concern that mutual funds were voting portfolio shares in 
blind accordance with company management’s recommendations . . . .” Belinfanti, 
supra note 14, at 438; see also supra note 42.
89. See NAT’L INVESTOR RELATION INST. & SOC’Y OF CORPORATE 
SECRETARIES & GOVERNANCE PROF’LS, PROXY ADVISORY SERVICES: THE NEED FOR 
MORE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND TRANSPARENCY 8-9 (2010) [hereinafter NIRI
LETTER], available at
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holdings would require less expense for research. However, 
diversification is an axiom of modern investment theory.90 In 
particular, institutional investors would divest stocks of smaller 
companies, for which holdings are likely to be smaller and for which 
the costs of proxy research would be harder to justify. This would be 
undesirable at a time when the number of publicly traded companies 
is already falling. It would also discourage investment in foreign 
companies, thereby increasing the investment risks of excessive 
dependence on the American economy.
Many mutual funds have conflicts of interest that incline them 
to vote with the issuer’s management.91 Some funds offer various 
corporate services, and therefore have an incentive to curry favor 
with managers of current and potential clients by voting shares of 
those companies that they own in line with the managers’ wishes.92
Thus, “the greater the dependency of [a mutual fund family] upon 
[corporate clients] for asset management business, the less likely the 
fund family will be to support shareholder-sponsored governance 
resolutions.”93 Thus, the recommendations of proxy advisors offset 
(but only somewhat) the tendency of institutions to vote with 
management.
Thus, restricting the use of proxy advisors would harm the 
institutional investors’ own shareholders—the very people whom the 
critics of proxy advisors supposedly want to help. It would favor 
larger institutions because they could better absorb the increased 
costs of proxy voting. The increased costs would be passed along to 
the institutions’ own investors, who would therefore suffer lower 
returns. These consequences seem unjustifiable when the 
corresponding benefits are dubious.
Alternatively, it has been suggested that institutional investors 
not vote at all on substantive issues.94 The idea is that if institutions 
http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/SCSGP_NIRI_Discussion_Draft_3-4-
2010.pdf; CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 86.
90. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN 
FROM COMMON STOCKS 42-46, 48-54, 115-31 (1969); JEFFREY J. HAAS, CORPORATE 
FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL § 26, at 150-52 (2004).
91. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
92. See Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, 
Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 
1401-06 (2014) (describing the conflicts of interest of many mutual funds).
93. Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund 
Advisers to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 846 (2009).
94. See APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 6-9. Institutions could 
submit a proxy simply to be present so as to satisfy the quorum requirement. Current 
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cannot cast a carefully, independently informed vote on an issue, 
they should simply abstain. This, too, is transparently self-serving 
advice from the minions of corporate executives. Many issuers still 
require only a plurality vote for election to the board. In these 
elections, abstentions are irrelevant since the official nominee can be 
elected with just a handful of votes from insiders. Further, as noted, 
many institutions are rationally reluctant to vote at all.95 For them, 
“mandatory voting facilitates a solution to the shareholders’
collective action problem.”96
Shareholder resolutions require a majority vote. Managers 
routinely oppose these resolutions, and institutions are likely to vote 
with management unless a resolution is supported by its proxy 
advisor. If proxy advisors are put out of business or reduced to 
insignificance, shareholder resolutions will become less effective. 
Moreover, if abstention becomes more common it will become even 
easier than it is now for boards of firms with majority voting for 
directors to leave in place a director who has not received a majority 
vote.97
The proxy advisory industry began largely because institutions 
sought expert help on voting.98 The rise of proxy advisors seems to 
have enhanced stock values.99 Regulation restricting the use of proxy 
advisors would reverse this trend; if some institutions cease to use 
proxy advisors, the advisors must raise their fees or reduce their 
services. Either response will cause more institutions to drop the 
service. Thus costs could spiral up, the collective action problem 
would resurface, and proxy voting would become less effective.
The purpose of the shareholder franchise is that managers 
should be accountable to shareholders and not absolute autocrats.100
federal regulations require (or seem to require) institutions to vote on substantive 
issues, so these regulations would have to be amended to allow routine abstention. 
See id. at 5-9.
95. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
96. Edelman, Thomas & Thompson, supra note 92, at 1424.
97. Many boards already ignore the failure of a candidate to receive a 
majority vote. See Stewart, supra note 57.
98. See Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 28-29 (citing remarks of Neil 
Minow, Co-Founder and Board Member, GMI Ratings).
99. See Jiekun Huang, Shareholder Coordination, Corporate Governance, 
and Firm Value 3-5 (Dec. 12, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2380284 (discussing how the “ease of coordination 
among institutional shareholders enhances firm value”).
100. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 
1988) (“The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the 
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”).
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Only if we want to rescind shareholder democracy does it make 
sense to forbid reliance on proxy advisors. Put another way, the 
question is whether it is better to have major influence from proxy 
advisors or to have managerial autocracy. The former, though 
imperfect, is clearly the better alternative.101
III. MONOPOLY
Critics claim that ISS exerts excessive influence because it 
enjoys a virtual monopoly in the proxy advisory industry.102 As 
discussed above, claims of ISS’s domination are exaggerated, partly 
because institutions have both additional outside sources and internal 
staffs for advice on how to vote.103 Nonetheless, the claims of 
monopoly deserve some discussion.
ISS and Glass Lewis together have over 90% of the proxy 
advisory market.104 High startup costs pose a daunting barrier to 
entry by newcomers.105 Although ISS and Glass Lewis compete with 
each other and with several smaller advisory firms, it is alleged that 
“[n]o sane institutional investor is going to assume the risk inherent 
in moving thousands of accounts and ballots from ISS to another 
provider. The chance that accounts would be lost, not voted, or voted 
incorrectly is far too great.”106
This concern seems overblown. First, only 15% to 20% of 
mutual funds have given ISS authority to vote their shares.107
Although this is a substantial number, most mutual funds can switch 
advisors without incurring this risk. Further, no institutional investor 
has ever been held liable for failing to vote proxies or voting them 
“incorrectly,” so the risk of liability for an institution switching to a 
new proxy advisor seems nonexistent.
101. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance Without 
Shareholders: A Cautionary Lesson from Non-Profit Organizations, 39 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 93 (2014) (stating that the absence of shareholder power in non-profit 
organizations generally leads to poor governance).
102. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 76-78 (alleging that ISS lacks 
serious competition); Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 411-17 (alleging that “ISS 
currently operates without significant competitive pressure”); GAO REPORT, supra
note 12, at 13-15 (referring to ISS’s “dominance in the proxy advisory industry”).
103. See supra notes 23-25, 67, 70-77 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 16.
105. See Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 94-97 (citing remarks of 
Michael Ryan, Vice President, Business Roundtable).
106. Romanek, supra note 83; see also Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 413-14.
107. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Although concentration is a concern in any industry, it is not 
clear that it has caused any problems in this case. ISS is not alleged 
to reap monopoly profits; even its critics acknowledge that its 
advisory operations are not very profitable.108 Even if we assume that 
the smaller proxy advisors do not give stiff competition to the 
duopoly of ISS and Glass Lewis, the ability of these two to extract 
supra-competitive profits is limited by the option of large institutions 
to perform proxy analysis in-house and of smaller institutions to 
follow the Wall Street Rule or some other simple formula for voting. 
There is some slight evidence that ISS pressures issuers to 
retain its consulting services by giving more favorable proxy voting 
recommendations to companies that do so.109 However, that practice 
seems to dissipate when Glass Lewis, which does not offer such 
consulting services, also gives proxy advice concerning an issuer.110
Glass Lewis has now grown and holds over 40% of the proxy 
advisory market.111 If ISS once had market power that allowed it to 
indulge in this practice, that power may be evaporating.
Further, the success of ISS and Glass Lewis is not alleged to 
stem from predation.112 It seems, rather, the product of economies of 
scale. Indeed some of the GAO’s interviewees “questioned whether 
the market could sustain the current number of firms.”113
Accordingly, it does not seem that restructuring the industry would 
have much impact in the long term since economics would push the 
industry toward renewed concentration. Perhaps the most telling 
evidence against the monopoly-profits thesis is that the proxy 
advisors’ clients—those who would be injured by excessive fees—
are not complaining.114
Ironically, proposals to regulate or limit the use of proxy 
advisors would exacerbate rather than alleviate concentration in the 
industry. If new measures reduced the use of proxy advisors, ISS 
could survive the decline, but smaller advisors might not. Further, 
the costs of regulation are more easily borne by large firms than by 
108. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 32.
109. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
110. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 35.
111. See LI, supra note 17, at 4, 35 fig.1. 
112. ISS has acquired several smaller advisors. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra
note 16, at 29-30. Further acquisitions could be a legitimate matter of concern for 
antitrust regulators.
113. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 15.
114. See id. at 15.
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small firms.115 The costs of the added regulations sought by critics of 
proxy advisors might increase rather than reduce concentration in the 
industry.
Thus, the complaints of monopoly seem intended more to 
harass proxy advisors than to remedy any real problems in the 
industry. Corporate managers dislike the large proxy advisors not 
because their fees are too high but because of the voting advice they 
give. However, the dominance of ISS and Glass Lewis suggests the 
soundness of their general approach to corporate governance issues. 
If their advice did not generally advance shareholder interests, 
competitors could lure away many of their clients by offering a 
different philosophy. Several institutions interviewed by the GAO 
reported that they “subscribe to ISS’s services . . . because they . . . 
trust it to provide reliable, efficient services.”116 Only because there 
is little disagreement among proxy advisors about their basic 
approach do the economies of scale enjoyed by the larger firms 
become dispositive.
If public issuers and their allies think that proxy advisors are 
doing a poor job, they can create their own proxy advisor to offer 
better service. This has not happened, which strongly suggests that 
competitors do not detect any fundamental client dissatisfaction with 
the industry leaders.117
Some complain that proxy advisors influence proxy voting 
even though they have no “skin in the game.”118 The charge is ironic 
because it is often alleged by corporate managers and their allies that 
the views of institutional investors are tainted because stock holdings 
make them short-term oriented and that this bias must be rectified by 
assigning firm governance to a board dominated by outside directors 
who have little “skin in the game” and, therefore, can be objective 
115. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 55.
116. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 13.
117. Some competitors “have attempted to differentiate themselves from ISS 
by . . . emphasizing that they provide only proxy advisory services and not corporate 
consulting services.” GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5. Their evident purpose is to 
avoid the conflict of interest that some have ascribed to ISS. See infra Part V. Also, 
“some firms have started to focus their research and recommendation services on 
particular types of proxy issues or on issues specific to individual corporations.” 
GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 14. However, no competitor has marketed a 
fundamentally different philosophy of corporate governance than ISS’s. See id.
118. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and 
Some of the New Challenges We (And Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 
(2005).
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and dispassionate.119 The charge is further ironic because executives 
and their allies invariably reject complaints that many corporate 
directors own little stock in their companies and, therefore, have 
little “skin in the game.” Again, the complaints against proxy 
advisors seem more self-interested than principled.
IV. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCURACY
A. Disclosure of Methodologies
One of [sic] most troubling developments with respect to proxy advisory 
firm analysis is the number and scope of inaccuracies in the research 
reports they produce on corporate issuers and a general lack of 
transparency in many of the methodologies, metrics and decision 
processes utilized by them to make voting recommendations.120
Proxy advisors already disclose much more than just their 
voting recommendations and corporate governance ratings, including 
much underlying data that they review and the general principles that 
they follow.121 ISS publishes its corporate governance policies 
annually.122 Every year there are changes, and ISS has recently added 
a feature to its website that allows an issuer to verify data underlying 
ISS’s evaluation of its compensation plan.123 If issuers feel that proxy 
advisors’ disclosures are inadequate, they can individually or 
collectively present their case to shareholders, and they do so.124
119. See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing 
Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
899, 956 (1993) (proposing that directors be “neutral referee[s]” for the various 
corporate constituencies).
120. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 55.
121. For example, after enactment of Dodd–Frank, Glass Lewis, “in response 
to client requests, . . . enhanced the types of information it presents to clients so they 
can make better informed decisions on say-on-pay votes.” Joyce, Say-on-Pay Votes 
Change Role, supra note 30, at 1306. ISS has issued a paper describing its methods 
for evaluating pay-for-performance compensation plans. See generally GARY 
HEWITT & CAROL BOWIE, EVALUATING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE ALIGNMENT: ISS’
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE APPROACH (2012) [hereinafter EVALUATING PAY 
FOR PERFORMANCE], available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/EvaluatingPay
ForPerformance_final_updated_02172012.pdf.
122. See, e.g., 2013 UPDATES, supra note 65, at 3.
123. See Michael Greene, ISS’s New Data Portal to Shed Light on Firms’ 
Evaluations, 17 Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA), at 104 (Sept. 1, 2014); ISS Releases 
Revamped Score Card on Governance Policies, 17 Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA), 
at 20 (Feb. 3, 2014).
124. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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Some critics argue for requiring proxy advisors to register 
under the Investment Advisers Act so as to achieve greater 
transparency.125 However, ISS is already a registered investment 
adviser required to describe its voting policies and procedures.126 A
registration requirement would only extend registration to smaller 
firms.
If there is a problem of inadequate transparency, it concerns not 
what ISS’s policies are but how it arrives at and implements its 
policies. ISS is open about how it develops its policies, but 
“precisely how those policies are implemented remains unclear. Even 
more unclear is how ISS determines a company’s [Corporate 
Governance Quotient] score.”127 However, it is not clear who is 
harmed by this alleged problem. Again, the clients of proxy advisors 
are not complaining or firing their advisors, and shareholder 
organizations are not complaining.128 Dissatisfaction seems to be 
limited to the managers of issuers whose monopoly on corporate 
power has been weakened by the proxy advisors.
Increasing the disclosure obligations of proxy advisors would 
increase their costs, which would have to be passed on to their 
clients. However, their services are not mandatory. Faced with 
higher fees, some institutions would probably just drop the service, 
which would require imposition of even higher fees on the shrinking 
client base. At the least this would mean many more institutions 
voting their shares blindly—quite possibly by following the Wall 
Street Rule. At the worst, it could destroy the economic viability of 
the proxy advisors. That is undoubtedly the result for which 
corporate executives and their hired guns hope.
Proxy advisors’ recommendations are currently exempt from 
SEC regulation of proxy solicitations.129 It has been proposed that 
proxy advisors be compelled to disclose the methodologies they use 
to make recommendations and compute corporate governance 
125. See NIRI LETTER, supra note 89, at 7 (“At a minimum, all proxy 
advisory firms should be required to register as investment advisers . . . under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.”).
126. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OMB NO. 3235-0049, FORM ADV:
UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR INVESTMENT ADVISER REGISTRATION pt. 2, at 8-9 (2014).
127. Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 419 (footnote omitted).
128. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 11.
129. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(3) (2014). Proxy advisors are, however, 
subject to rule 14a-9’s prohibition on materially false and misleading statements. See
Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62495, at 
109 (July 14, 2010) [hereinafter Concept Release].
1312 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1287
ratings.130 This would be unwise. Proxy advisors’ clients are large, 
sophisticated institutions. Any client that wants more information 
from a proxy advisor can demand it and take its business elsewhere 
if that information is denied. Clients are not demanding more 
information from proxy advisors; they seem satisfied with the status 
quo. Increased disclosure requirements would raise advisors’ costs 
(and fees) without generating much benefit.
The required disclosures would also include valuable 
proprietary information.131 Proxy advisors’ product is their advice. 
Requiring them to disclose their methodologies would be like 
requiring a chef to disclose her recipes. Competitors might use 
information released by ISS to make their own recommendations 
without bearing the costs that ISS incurred to conduct research and 
formulate its voting policies and corporate governance ratings.132
B. Factual Errors by Proxy Advisors
Proxy advisors are accused of committing many significant 
factual errors in their research reports.133 One alleged reason for 
errors or poor judgment by proxy advisors is 
[t]he sheer volume of shareholder votes requiring recommendations each 
year, numbering in the tens of thousands, which is straining the capacity of 
the proxy advisors’ production system and jeopardizing the integrity and 
credibility of the output. The large and growing number of annual voting 
recommendations, largely crammed into a four-month proxy season, 
dictates that proxy advisors automate their decision-making processes to 
the greatest extent feasible and that both inputs and outputs be as simple as 
130. Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 434-35; CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16,
at 86; Wilczek, Nasdaq Petitions SEC, supra note 7, at 1927-28 (requesting 
mandatory disclosure of “‘the models, formulas and methodologies pursuant to 
which [proxy advisers] evaluate and make recommendations regarding how 
shareholders should vote’” (quoting Nasdaq’s petition)).
131. “[T]he algorithms and data used by [proxy advisory] firms are 
considered proprietary.” David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Do ISS Voting 
Recommendations Create Shareholder Value?, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES 
(Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Stanford, Cal.), Apr. 19, 2011, at 1, available at
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/13_ExchangeOffers.pdf.
132. ISS’s procedures in formulating its policies include distributing a 
survey (which in 2013 received over 500 responses) and conducting roundtables 
with institutional investors and issuers. See Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 131 
(citing remarks of Gary Retelny, President, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.).
133. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 55.
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possible, making consideration of each company’s particular 
circumstances infeasible.134
It is further alleged that all this has led to “[g]rowing discontent on 
the part of companies and company advisers with the one-size-fits-all 
analytics used by proxy advisory firms, as well as with the lack of 
transparency of the firms’ analytics and the lack of satisfactory 
processes for correction of errors and of opportunities for 
questioning conclusions.”135 Critics want proxy advisors to commit 
greater resources so as to exercise “due care” and achieve 
“completeness” in their analyses.136
How accurate is the charge of frequent errors? The Center On 
Executive Compensation (COEC) made the claim based on two 
surveys by COEC’s parent, HR Policy Association, of its own 
members—that is, public companies. “Of those responding [in one 
survey], 53 percent said that a proxy advisory firm had made one or 
more mistakes in a final published report on the company’s
compensation programs.”137
The indictment has several flaws. First, COEC does not report 
what percent of the companies surveyed bothered to respond. 
Presumably those that believed they had been victims of errors 
would be more likely to respond. Second, nearly half of respondents 
reported no errors.138 Third, we are not told how many reports were 
filed or how many years were covered. The 53% figure seems to 
include any company that reported a single error in any year by any 
proxy advisor.
Most important, we have no way of knowing how significant 
these errors were or even if the charges are true. Many complaints 
alleged use of an improper peer group or peer data.139 Issuers who 
134. APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 1.
135. Id. The same report alleges that proxy advisors use “inflexible, one-
size-fits-all voting policies and simplistic analytic models designed to utilize 
standard and easily accessible inputs that can be derived from readily available data 
and to avoid any need for particularized research or the application of meaningful 
judgment.” Id. at 4; see also Che Odom, Directors: On Compensation, Proxy 
Advisers Missing Mark, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE REP. (BNA), at 6 (Jan. 6, 2014) 
(quoting a former executive as saying that on say-on-pay proxy advisors “base their
advice on inflexible models that don’t take into account many variables unique to a 
company”).
136. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 55, 86.
137. Id. at 58. The COEC reports only anecdotes, not statistical data, from its 
other survey. Id. at 58-59.
138. See id. at 58.
139. Id. at 10, 58. 
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believe that such an error has occurred can present their cases to the 
advisor, and many do.140 In 96% of such complaints about a draft 
report, the statements were not adjusted in the final report.141 This 
suggests that the proxy advisor simply disagreed with the issuer 
about the proper peer group or data.142
Information is never complete. Under the principle of bounded 
rationality, decision makers must first decide how much information 
to gather before making a substantive decision.143 In business, this is 
a matter of business judgment with which courts rarely interfere.144
Corporate executives would be outraged if the SEC tried to dictate 
required levels of investigation in other areas. Similarly, the SEC 
should not dictate standards of investigation for proxy advisors. The 
market—that is, the proxy advisors’ clients—will dictate the proper 
level of research.
The COEC report specifically suggests that “inaccuracies at 
ISS [may be] negatively impacting the compensation programs at a 
meaningful number of companies.”145 However, COEC presents no 
evidence of “inaccuracies” beyond the general and bare management 
complaints already mentioned. Of course, if ISS does commit an 
error, issuers may solicit shareholders (as proxy advisors may not) 
and seek to correct it. COEC does not say how many of the plans 
opposed by ISS were actually disapproved by shareholders or how 
140. See Strine, supra note 118, at 688 (“[P]owerful CEOs come on bended 
knee to Rockville, Maryland, where ISS resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of 
the merits of their views . . . .”).
141. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 58.
142.
[O]ften what a corporation indicates is an error is ultimately a difference 
in interpretation or opinion regarding a certain issue, and therefore 
requires no correction. As of May 31, 2013, material errors in Glass 
Lewis’ research (brought to our attention by the company, its advisors or 
through subsequent disclosure) that resulted in a change to the Glass 
Lewis recommendation represented one-tenth of 1% of the items up for 
vote at US companies analyzed by Glass Lewis.
Examining the Market Power and Impact of Proxy Advisory Firms: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 113th Cong. 416 (2013) [hereinafter Examining the Market Power]
(statement of Katherine H. Rabin, CEO, Glass, Lewis & Co.).
143. For a discussion of this concept, see Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard 
Selten, Rethinking Rationality, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
1, 5 (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2002). 
144. See generally FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW §§ 4.1.2-
4.1.3, at 286-311 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the business judgment rule and its 
consequences).
145. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 61.
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many of those plans were actually altered as a result of the negative 
vote. In general, executive compensation has continued to rise far 
faster than the rate of inflation or of the growth of the economy,146 so 
it does not seem that proxy advisors’ errors have caused a general 
impairment of executive pay (although it might not be a bad thing if 
it had). In sum, we have no solid evidence of how many errors proxy 
advisors have committed or whether those errors have caused any 
damage.
Accepting, however, that accuracy is better than error, we 
should ask what remedies are proposed to reduce errors. Some 
comments made to the SEC in response to its Proxy Concept 
Release147 urged that proxy advisors “be required to allow companies 
to review and comment on their research before it is issued, at least 
to permit correction of factual errors, and that they be required to be 
far more transparent about their internal decision making processes 
and outcomes.”148 Others would require “consideration of each 
company’s particular circumstances.”149
At the least, a “right to correct” would create serious timing 
problems. An advisor cannot prepare a report until it receives the 
146. See Gretchen Morgenson, An Unstoppable Climb in C.E.O. Pay, N.Y.
TIMES (June 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/30/business/an-
unstoppable-climb-in-ceo-pay.html. Some studies have found that say-on-pay has 
had little or no impact on managers’ pay. See Christopher S. Armstrong, Ian D. Gow 
& David F. Larcker, The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity 
Compensation Plans, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 909, 948 (2013); see also Vicente Cuñat, 
Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm 
Performance 26 (Oct. 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2514731; 
Mathias Kronlund & Shastri Sandy, Does Shareholder Scrutiny Affect Executive 
Compensation? Evidence from Say-on-Pay Voting 3-4 (Oct. 20, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2358696. One study finds that 
say-on-pay actually increased executive pay, and also the sensitivity of pay to 
performance. Peter Iliev & Svetia Vitanova, The Effect of Say-on-Pay in the U.S. 3
(Feb. 27, 2014), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2235064. However, 
another study found that executive pay rates have risen more slowly in countries that 
have say-on-pay than in countries that do not. Ricardo Correa & Ugur Lel, Say on 
Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Valuation Around the 
World 2 (Apr. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243921. And one study finding little impact on executive 
pay nonetheless found that say-on-pay has increased firm value in countries where it 
has been adopted. See Cuñat, Giné & Guadalupe, supra, at 23.
147. See generally Concept Release, supra note 129.
148. APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 5; see also CALL FOR 
CHANGE, supra note 16, at 10; NIRI LETTER, supra note 89, at 8.
149. See APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 1 (criticizing proxy 
advisors for failing to give such consideration).
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issuer’s proxy statement, and it must then deliver its report to its 
clients in time for them to vote. Issuers are already free to object to a 
report and seek corrections,150 but the schedules for proxy votes leave 
little time for this process.151 A regulatory “right to correct” would 
have to be accompanied by a rule revision requiring issuers to file 
their proxy statements sooner (which no issuer has recommended), 
or it would leave proxy advisors unable to deliver their reports in 
time to be considered by their clients.
Further, with a “right to correct,” issuers’ lawyers could easily 
devise and publish a standard-form complaint to be filed by every 
issuer that receives an unfavorable recommendation. The form 
complaint would charge that the advisor failed to consider the 
“company’s particular circumstances”152 and reached unwarranted 
conclusions. For each complaint, the advisor would presumably have 
to provide a hearing before a disinterested arbiter and prepare a 
detailed answer to the complaint. Every recommendation to vote 
against management would lead to an expensive dispute. 
Presumably, due process would also require the same right to a 
hearing for the supporters of every shareholder resolution that 
received a negative recommendation from an advisor.
The charge of a one-size-fits-all approach is at best grossly 
exaggerated.153 ISS has a sophisticated approach to evaluate “pay for 
performance” that makes several distinctions.154 Moreover, proxy 
advisors offer clients custom voting policies, which further belies the 
one-size-fits-all charge.155 It is true, however, that ISS does not make 
the kind of individualized review that each board of directors makes 
150. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
151. See Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 140 (citing remarks of Michael 
Ryan, Vice President, Business Roundtable, on the limited amount of time available 
to proxy advisors); id. at 141 (citing remarks of Gary Retelny, President, 
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., stating that ISS tries to give issuers twenty-
four to forty-eight hours to respond to their reports).
152. See APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 1.
153. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
154. See EVALUATING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE, supra note 121, at 6. ISS also 
claims that it makes case-by-case determinations. See infra note 174 and 
accompanying text. One study concluded that proxy advisors look at each firm’s 
performance and compensation scheme in making their recommendations and “do 
not appear to follow a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.” Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & 
David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay 
(Columbia Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 13-88, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2360156. 
155. See Sagiv Edelman, Comment, Proxy Advisory Firms: A Guide for 
Regulatory Reform, 62 EMORY L.J. 1369, 1391-92 (2013).
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when adopting an executive compensation plan. Indeed, given the 
hundreds of thousands of resolutions on which ISS makes 
recommendations, it could not make such a review within a workable 
cost structure. As critics acknowledge, providing recommendations 
on every resolution for thousands of companies is already a 
“monumental task.”156 Requiring further customization would raise 
advisors’ costs—and fees.
Given the heavy burden that the regulations recommended by 
critics would impose, it is unsurprising that even COEC is 
ambivalent about greater regulation of proxy advisors, recognizing 
that increased regulation would increase costs and that the “impact of 
these increased costs would likely be most significant . . . for smaller 
firms in the industry and potential new entrants, rather than on the 
industry leaders.”157 As COEC says, proxy advisor errors arise from 
“lack of adequate resources and quality control procedures, pressures 
on the industry to reduce costs and the extremely short turnaround 
time available for proxy analyses.”158 Regulation cannot change these 
factors for the better. The market exerts a cost–benefit analysis that 
seems to result in the proper degree of care and accuracy in proxy 
advisors’ reports.
C. Misguided Policies
A different order of alleged error concerns the basic philosophy 
of proxy advisors about corporate governance. One study concluded 
that the corporate governance ratings issued by ISS, 
GovernanceMetrics International, and The Corporate Library “have 
either limited or no success in predicting firm performance or other 
outcomes of interest to shareholders.”159 Other empirical studies have 
questioned the benefits of proxy advisors concerning stock option 
repricing160 and say-on-pay policies.161
156. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 55; see also APOTHEOSIS OR 
APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 3-4 (describing the scope of ISS’s task); LATHAM &
WATKINS, supra note 80, at 5 (stating that such a mandate would “impos[e] greater 
cost on the institutional voting system”).
157. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 74; see also Rose, supra note 44,
at 924 (“SEC regulation of the industry may actually increase the market power of 
the few major corporate governance players.”).
158. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 55.
159. Robert M. Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the Ratings: 
How Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 439, 460 (2010).
160. See generally David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, 
Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges (Rock Ctr. for Corporate 
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It is not clear that these findings are accurate. One other study 
found that high scores on ISS’s Corporate Governance Quotient 
(CGQ) were associated with higher current stock returns, higher 
accounting returns, lower volatility, and higher dividends, although 
this study was backward-looking and did not address the predictive 
value of the CGQ.162 Another backward-looking study found that 
companies with high ISS corporate governance ratings were less 
likely to use opportunistic timing of executive stock options.163 It is 
also possible that the criteria used in the more recent study failed to 
detect the benefits of the corporate governance ratings.164 ISS also 
revises its policies continually165 and has revised them several times 
since that study was published.166 It is possible that corporate 
governance ratings have improved since the critical studies were 
conducted.
Governance, Working Paper No. 100, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811130.
161. See generally David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, 
The Economic Consequences of Proxy Advisor Say-on-Pay Voting Policies (Rock 
Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 119, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101453; see also George Paulin, Five ‘Say-on-Pay’ 
Lessons, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 29, 2011), 
http://www.businessweek.com/management/five-sayonpay-lessons-07292011.html 
(stating that for say-on-pay resolutions “ISS uses a flawed methodology”).
162. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and 
Firm Performance 15 (Dec. 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=586423.
163. See Pandej Chintrakarn, Pornsit Jiraporn & J.C. Kim, The Effect of 
Corporate Governance on CEO Luck: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) 2 (June 8, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2276585.
164. For example, “[o]ne possible explanation for the absence of robust 
relations between the three primary governance ratings and operating performance is 
that it may take more than three years for the effects of good or bad governance . . . 
to be observed in firm profits.” Daines, Gow & Larcker, supra note 159, at 451.
165. See Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 112-13 (citing remarks of Gary
Retelny, President, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., on the process ISS goes 
through to review its policies).
166. The study used data through early 2007. See Daines, Gow & Larcker, 
supra note 159, at 443. Since then ISS has revised its approach to corporate 
governance ratings. In 2013, ISS introduced “Governance QuickScore,” a 
“quantitatively-driven” data solution “designed to help institutional investors 
identify governance risk within portfolio companies.” INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER 
SERVS., ISS GOVERNANCE QUICKSCORE 2.0: OVERVIEW AND UPDATES 3 (2014),
available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/ISSGovernanceQuickScore2.0.
pdf. It made further revisions in 2014. See id.; see also ISS Releases Revamped 
Score Card, supra note 123, at 20.
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The study questioning the value of proxy advisors’ say-on-pay 
policies is also dubious. Say-on-pay is an issue on which institutions 
rely heavily on proxy advisors.167 In general, giving shareholders a 
say on pay seems to have been beneficial both here and abroad.168
ISS recommendations in support of dissident shareholders have been 
“associated with positive abnormal [stock] returns.”169 These facts 
suggest that the policies of proxy advisors are not misguided.
However, even if ISS’s corporate governance ratings have little 
predictive value and proxy advisors’ voting recommendations are 
suboptimal, it is not clear that the government should step in. Any 
restriction on issuing ratings could violate the First Amendment and 
squelch the search for useful ratings.170 Issuers and critics of the 
ratings are free to voice their objections and have done so.171 Their 
efforts may have succeeded. One study found that corporate 
167. See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
168. See Cuñat, Giné & Guadalupe, supra note 146, at 1 (finding that 
adoption of say-on-pay requirement led to a 4.6% increase in market values); Lilian 
Ng et al., Does Shareholder Approval Requirement of Equity Compensation Plans 
Matter?, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1510, 1510 (2011) (finding that the quality of equity 
compensation proposals improved after adoption of say-on-pay requirements); 
Steven Balsam & Jennifer Yin, The Impact of Say-on-Pay on Executive 
Compensation 22 (Mar. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2026121 (finding improved compensation structures 
after adoption of say-on-pay requirements); Marinilka B. Kimbro & Danielle Xu, 
Shareholders Have a Say on Executive Compensation: Evidence from Say-on-Pay in 
the United States 1 (Apr. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209936 (finding that 
“shareholder voting rights—even when non-binding—could be an effective 
mechanism of corporate governance”); see also supra note 146. Variations of say-
on-pay have also been adopted in the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Australia, 
Sweden, Norway, and India. See Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay 
Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527, 527, 562-
63 (2013).
169. See Cindy R. Alexander et al., The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy 
Voting 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15143, 2009), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15143.pdf.
170. The status of corporate governance ratings and proxy advisors’ 
recommendations under the First Amendment is unclear. Some courts have held that 
similar pronouncements are protected unless shown to be made with actual malice. 
See First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., 690 F. Supp. 256, 259 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing a suit for common law fraud alleging an inaccurate 
description of a company’s convertible bonds), aff’d, 869 F.2d 175 (1989); In re
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig. v. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d 
742, 825 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (alleging negligent misrepresentation by a bond rating 
agency).
171. See Paulin, supra note 161 (“At one large company . . . management
made more than 200 calls to investors in order to get a narrow say-on-pay win.”).
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governance ratings had very little effect on the outcomes of 
shareholder voting.172 Investors can decide for themselves how much 
to credit these ratings; there is no need for government intrusion.
A related criticism is that “proxy advisory firms are working 
hand-in-hand with unions and other activist institutional shareholders 
to impose social agendas on corporations that are immaterial to the 
business interests of the companies and their shareholders.”173 ISS 
denies this charge. “When evaluating social and environmental 
shareholder proposals, ISS . . . [g]enerally vote[s] CASE-BY-CASE, 
taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is 
likely to enhance or protect shareholder value,” and adding some 
other factors it considers.174 Moreover, proxy advisors may be even 
less influential on “social responsibility” issues than on other 
questions.175
Institutional shareholders are not complaining about ISS’s
policies.176 If there were latent dissatisfaction, competitors would 
certainly exploit it by highlighting their policy differences. They do 
not. Other than proclaiming their overall quality, the smaller proxy 
advisors seek to differentiate themselves from ISS by stressing that 
they have no conflicts of interest because they do not offer corporate 
governance consulting services, not by offering different policies.177
Regulation to hobble proxy advisors might not even benefit the 
corporate managers who are pushing such regulation. Some investors 
vote against management more often than their proxy advisor 
recommends,178 which suggests that whatever influence proxy 
advisors have may be less anti-management than many managers 
seem to believe. Also, the influence of hedge funds and other activist 
172. See Daines, Gow & Larcker, supra note 159, at 459-60.
173. Richard Hill, Financial Services Lawmakers Spar over Influence of 
Proxy Advisory Firms, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), at 1081 (June 10, 2013) 
(citing House Financial Services Capital Markets Subcommittee Chairman Scott 
Garret); James R. Copland, Politicized Proxy Advisers vs. Individual Investors,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2012, at A17.
174. 2013 UPDATES, supra note 65, at 18.
175. In one survey, institutional investors reported that they found proxy 
firm data most useful in say-on-pay and international votes. BEW & FIELDS, supra
note 27, at 2, 4, 13. “Most of our research participants indicated that they treat 
environmental and social proposals on a case-by-case basis, drawing on a variety of 
sources of input.” Id. at 25.
176. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
177. See LI, supra note 17, at 5.
178. See supra note 173-175 and accompanying text.
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investors has mushroomed in recent years.179 In battles over firm 
policy, managers must persuade shareholders that their opposition to 
the activist furthers the interests of the shareholders and not just the 
managers’ own interests. As disinterested experts, proxy advisors 
can give managers invaluable credibility by supporting them. 
Recently, activist Carl Icahn dropped his call for a big stock 
repurchase by Apple due in part to the opposition of ISS.180 Proxy 
advisors and activist investors (like Icahn and hedge funds) offer 
alternative means for shareholders to wield influence. If proxy 
advisors are curbed, institutional investors will be forced to pay more 
attention to activist investors.181 Presumably this is not what 
corporate executives want.
In sum, the market dictates the conduct of proxy advisors; their 
clients are content with their services. Pleas for further regulation 
come from managerial interests that want only to hamper the 
effectiveness of those services.
V. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
ISS and some other proxy advisors have registered under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.182 Registered advisers are ipso 
facto fiduciaries.183 However, providing proxy-voting advice alone 
does not require registration.184 Several advisors have not registered 
179. See Gelles, supra note 39 (“[A]ctivist investors have upended relations 
between companies and institutional investors in recent years.”).
180. See Michael J. de la Merced, Icahn Ends Call for Apple Stock Buyback,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014, at B4.
181. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Agency Capitalism: Further 
Implications of Equity Intermediation 17-18 (European Corporate Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 239, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2359690 
(explaining how activist investors enable shareholders to wield influence when no 
other means are available).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1940). “Of the five major proxy advisory firms, 
three—ISS, [Marco Consulting Group], and [Proxy Governance, Inc.]—are 
registered with SEC as investment advisers and are subject to agency oversight, 
while according to corporate officials, the other two firms are not.” GAO REPORT,
supra note 12, at 8.
183. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 
(1963).
184. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(3) (2014). The SEC believes that whether a 
proxy advisor must register under the Act “depends on several factors.” Concept 
Release, supra note 129, at 112. The statute defines “investment adviser” as 
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising 
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value 
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling 
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and thus are not deemed fiduciaries.185 Registered advisers must also 
disclose their potential conflicts of interest.186 ISS has done this.187
It is said that “[t]he trend of substituting ISS’ recommendations 
for those of company managers means that mutual funds are 
replacing agents who are constrained by relatively strong fiduciary 
duties with agents who have relatively weak fiduciary duties.”188 The 
Department of Labor has proposed a rule to make proxy advisors 
fiduciaries with respect to ERISA plans for which they provide 
advice.189 This would subject them to ERISA liability for breaches of 
the duties of loyalty and care.190
It is questionable what this step would achieve and whether it is 
needed. Corporate managers have very different interests from those 
of their shareholders. When managers held an iron grip on 
shareholder voting through their control of the corporate proxy 
machinery and shareholders were weak due to the collective action 
problem, managers had wide discretion to serve their own interests 
rather than the shareholders’. Although managers still control the 
corporate proxy machinery, the rise of proxy advisors has greatly 
alleviated the collective action problem.
The consequences of saddling proxy advisors with fiduciary 
duties would depend largely on the details of the regulation.
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to 
further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe 
as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these 
obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?191
The SEC has said that “as a fiduciary, [a] proxy advisory firm 
has a duty of care requiring it to make a reasonable investigation to 
determine that it is not basing its recommendations on materially 
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, 
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities[,] 
with certain exceptions. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) 
(1940). Some proxy advisors believe that their activities do not meet this definition. 
A proposed rule of the Department of Labor could also classify proxy advisors as 
fiduciaries. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
185. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 8.
186. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 191-92.
187. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
188. Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 423.
189. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263 (proposed Oct. 
22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510).
190. See APOTHEOSIS OR APOGEE?, supra note 37, at 1.
191. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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inaccurate or incomplete information.”192 The question here would be 
what constitutes a “reasonable investigation” when a firm makes 
recommendations on tens of thousands of resolutions involving 
thousands of companies.
As a registered investment advisor, ISS is already subject to 
fiduciary duties.193 No complaints have been filed against it for 
failing to discharge these duties. Compelling smaller proxy advisors 
to register would accomplish nothing but to impose extra costs on 
them. The added costs could force them out of business, thereby 
reducing competition. As already discussed, market forces will 
induce the proper level of care; further SEC regulation is not needed 
and could be counterproductive.194
ISS has also been accused of two kinds of conflicts of interest. 
First, it “advises institutional investor clients on how to vote their 
proxies and at the same time provides consulting services to help 
corporations develop management proposals and improve their 
corporate governance. . . . [T]his could lead corporations to feel 
obligated to retain ISS’s consulting services in order to obtain 
favorable proxy vote recommendations.”195 The COEC believes that 
it is “impossible for a proxy advisory firm to provide both 
[consulting services to corporate issuers and proxy voting advice] 
and still meet their fiduciary obligations to institutional investors.”196
It therefore calls on the SEC to ban the practice.197
ISS dismisses this concern for two reasons. First, it discloses 
information about its potential conflicts.198 Second, its proxy 
advisory and corporate consulting businesses have separate staff, 
operate in separate buildings, and use segregated office equipment 
and information databases.199
192. Concept Release, supra note 129, at 119.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
194. See supra Part IV.
195. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 4; see also Concept Release, supra note 
129, at 116-18.
196. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 85.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 45; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 10.
199. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., INC., DUE DILIGENCE 
COMPLIANCE PACKAGE 3 (2010), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/
files/ISSDueDiligenceCompliancePackage.pdf; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 
12, at 10; Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 110-11 (citing remarks of Gary 
Retelny, President, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., as describing the steps 
taken to achieve this separation).
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Some consider these steps inadequate. One objection is that 
ISS’s disclosure is too vague; it is only “a blanket disclosure . . . that 
they may have done business with the corporation that is the subject 
of the report and direct readers to an email address where they can 
ask for more information.”200 The SEC has been urged to require 
disclosure of any potential conflict with respect to any proposal.201
ISS treats the identity of its clients as confidential.202 Evidently, 
most clients appreciate this; they could disclose the relationship 
themselves if they wished, and few do so. Consultants are not 
generally compelled to identify their clients, and ISS should not be 
required to do so unless good cause is shown.
Concerns about conflicts of interest are overblown and 
somewhat anomalous. ISS’s supposed conflicts could distort its 
recommendations in one of two ways. ISS could punish issuers who 
eschew its consulting services by opposing its management 
proposals even when ISS would ordinarily support them; or ISS 
could reward issuers that do hire it as a consultant by supporting its 
management proposals even when they would ordinarily be opposed. 
A recent study suggests that the latter is the dominant effect. Tao Li 
found that “when Glass Lewis began to cover a company for the first 
time, ISS’s average ‘For’ recommendations for its management 
proposals dropped by 1.9-2.3%.”203
In other words, ISS’s consulting services may enable issuers to 
bribe ISS to get better recommendations than they deserve. Some of 
ISS’s competitors, including Glass Lewis, exploit this possibility; 
they challenge ISS’s supposed conflicts by providing proxy advice 
only.204 Institutions that think ISS takes bribes from issuers can 
switch advisors. Limiting or ending ISS’s corporate governance 
services thus might result in more unfavorable voting 
recommendations. Moreover, ISS’s ratings are worth only what 
respect they command among investors. If issuers believe that some 
ratings are punishment for rejecting ISS’s corporate governance 
200. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 69.
201. Concept Release, supra note 129, at 120; Edelman, supra note 155, at 
1406-07.
202. See LI, supra note 17, at 5.
203. Id.
204. See Examining the Market Power, supra note 142, at 2 (statement of 
Katherine H. Rabin, CEO, Glass, Lewis & Co.) (“Glass Lewis does not provide 
consulting services to issuers . . . .”); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 14; 
Concept Release, supra note 129, at 117 n.277. Glass Lewis does not offer corporate 
governance advice, which may explain in part its growing favor with institutional 
investors. See Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 397.
A Defense of Proxy Advisors 1325
services, they can say so individually and collectively. Investors can 
decide whom to believe.
COEC suggests that ISS’s consulting services may subsidize its 
advisory business.205 Perhaps the critics hope that curbing or ending 
ISS’s consulting activities would put it out of business or force it to 
raise fees for its proxy advisory services, thereby losing many cost-
conscious clients, and that this would reduce ISS’s influence, to the 
benefit of corporate executives. Even without regulation, however, 
the growth of Glass Lewis may be diminishing the ability of ISS to 
extort issuers.206 Since the consequences of restricting or banning 
ISS’s consulting services are so uncertain and ISS’s proxy advice 
clients are not complaining, the case for regulation is not compelling.
Another alleged conflict is that proxy advisors give 
recommendations on shareholder proposals and “vote no” campaigns 
proposed by client firms.207 The concern is that “proxy advisory 
firms will make favorable recommendations to other institutional 
investor clients on such proposals in order to maintain the business
of the investor clients that submitted these proposals.”208 This does 
not seem to be a major problem. First, the critics offer no evidence 
that advisors discard their usual principles to support proxy 
campaigns by their clients or that shareholder campaigns are favored 
more often by proxy advisors hired by the proponent than by other 
proxy advisors.209 The burden of proof should be on those seeking 
further regulation, and they have not sustained that burden.
Further, if shareholder activists succeed, in most cases they get 
no more pro rata benefit than any other shareholder. In these cases 
there is no reason to fear that the proxy advisor is favoring the 
proponent at the expense of its other clients. If the proponent does 
205. See CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 32.
206. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Two smaller proxy advisors 
also highlight their lack of conflicts of interest in touting their services. See EGAN-
JONES PROXY SERVS., EGAN-JONES PROXY SERVICES CONFLICT ANALYSIS (2014),
available at http://www.ejproxy.com/public/disclosures/Egan-Jones_Proxy_Services
_Conflict_of_Interest_Report.pdf (stating that Egan-Jones does not engage in 
consulting with companies it covers); see also Proxy Voting, MARCO CONSULTING 
GROUP, http://www.marcoconsulting.com/proxy-voting-pages-147.php (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2014) (“Since MCG does not render consulting services to the corporate 
community, it has no conflicts of interest.”).
207. See E-mail from Niels Holch, Exec. Dir., S’holder Commc’ns Coal., to 
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/SCCLetter11712.pdf.
208. GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 12.
209. See id.
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stand to gain some special benefit or has some non-economic (e.g., 
political) agenda, issuers are free and able to point that out.
Any institution that is troubled by ISS’s supposed conflicts is 
free to switch advisors. However, all the institutions that the GAO 
interviewed “said that they are satisfied with the steps that ISS has 
taken to mitigate its potential conflicts.”210 Clients of ISS are also 
free to ignore its advice if they believe that the advice is tainted, and 
institutions do often ignore its advice, especially the larger 
institutions and especially on higher profile issues.211
Glass Lewis is also charged with conflicts of interest because it 
is owned by Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board and Alberta 
Investment Management Corp.212 Glass Lewis denies that these 
relationships pose any problem because it operates independently of 
its owners.213 As with ISS’s Chinese Wall between its proxy advisory 
and corporate governance consulting services, the adequacy of Glass 
Lewis’s separation from its owners cannot be judged by direct 
observation because no formal division can prevent the parties from 
collaborating if they wish to do so. We can only observe whether 
Glass Lewis’s advice seems to be biased. The affected parties—
Glass Lewis’s clients—are not complaining, so neither should 
anyone else.
There is considerable irony and audacity in the complaints 
about proxy advisors’ supposed conflicts of interest. “Shareholder 
activists have long complained that mutual fund and asset 
management companies have an inherent conflict of interest, since 
they may be managing company retirement plans, or hoping to gain 
access to them.”214 One function of proxy advisors is to give these 
210. Id. at 11.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 33, 67, and 79-82.
212. About Us, GLASS LEWIS & CO., http://www.glasslewis.com/about-glass-
lewis/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
213. Glass Lewis’s says: 
Glass Lewis operates as an independent company separate from OTPP and 
AIMCo. Neither OTPP nor AIMCO are involved in the day-to-day 
management of Glass Lewis’ business. Moreover, Glass Lewis excludes 
OTPP and AIMCo from any involvement in the formulation and 
implementation of its proxy voting policies and guidelines, and in the 
determination of voting recommendations for specific shareholder 
meetings.
Conflict of Interest Statement, GLASS LEWIS & CO.,
http://www.glasslewis.com/about-glass-lewis/disclosure-of-conflict/ (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2014).
214. Stewart, supra note 57; see also Edelman, Thomas & Thompson, supra
note 92, at 1401 (stating that “[i]nstitutional investors’ conflicts of interest vary by 
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asset managers an untainted basis for voting when the managers have 
such conflicts.215 The critics of ISS make no complaint about this 
conflict of interest, which inclines many institutional investors to 
vote with management. They complain only when there may be a 
conflict of interest that might lead to votes against management.
Only corporate managers and their mouthpieces are 
complaining about ISS’s conflicts of interest. It seems likely that 
their concern is not any injury to institutional investors or their 
beneficiaries since they have not shown any such injury. What seems 
to bother them is that proxy advisors have helped to loosen the 
executives’ domination of shareholder voting.
VI. FURTHER REGULATORY PROPOSALS
It has been recommended that an oversight board be created for 
the proxy advisory industry similar to the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Boards (PCAOB) with power to promulgate 
and enforce industry standards and to conduct inspections.216
However, the accounting industry is very different. PCAOB was 
created because investors lost billions of dollars from accounting 
fraud and from corporate actions that were not revealed by auditors 
because they were not caught by existing accounting and auditing 
practices.217 By contrast, there has been no showing of losses to 
investors from the actions of proxy advisors.
investor category” and describing these conflicts). See generally Gerald F. Davis & 
E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 552
(2007).
215. See Proxy Roundtable, supra note 8, at 80-86 (citing remarks of 
Yukako Kawata, Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP). SEC rules require 
investment advisors to have policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure 
that they vote proxies in the best interests of their beneficiaries. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.206(4)-6 (2012). The SEC says that “an adviser could demonstrate that the 
vote was not a product of a conflict of interest if it voted client securities, in 
accordance with a pre-determined policy, based upon the recommendations of an 
independent third party.” Final Rule: Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2014).
216. See Belinfanti, supra note 14, at 436-37; CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 
16, at 70-71.
217. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal 
Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 268 (2004)
(stating that Congress adopted the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (including PCAOB) in 
response to the financial scandals of 2001).
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The critics have not said what industry standards are needed 
and what inspections of proxy advisors would be intended to detect 
and correct. If the regulations of an oversight board merely 
duplicated what market forces demand, they would be superfluous. If 
they required something different from what the market demands, 
the requirements would probably be counterproductive. To create an 
oversight board without a clear vision of what problems it needs to 
address and how it will solve them is to invite mischief.
Another proposal is to subject proxy advisors to regulation 
similar to that for credit rating agencies by the SEC.218 This 
comparison is also flawed. The advice of proxy advisors is given to 
and used by the clients who hire them, while the ratings of credit 
rating agencies are used by purchasers of securities even though the
agencies are paid by the issuers of the securities. Thus, credit rating 
agencies have an inherent incentive to curry favor with clients by 
giving inflated ratings, to the detriment of purchasers who rely on 
these ratings. Proxy advisors have no such skewed incentives.
New regulation was instituted for credit rating agencies after 
many bonds rated as very safe by the agencies defaulted, causing 
bond owners huge losses.219 No such tragedy has befallen the 
institutional clients of proxy advisors or the institutions’ own 
investors, and neither the institutions nor their investors are 
demanding more regulation of proxy advisors; the demands are 
coming from issuers and their allies. The proper analogy here, then, 
would be a situation in which issuers complained that credit rating 
agencies were being too negative. In that case it is unlikely that 
Congress would have imposed costly new regulations but would 
have left it to the market to handle the alleged problem. That seems 
to be the appropriate response with respect to proxy advisors.
Another proposal is for greater self-regulation of proxy 
advisors through a voluntary code of best practices.220 There is 
218. CALL FOR CHANGE, supra note 16, at 70. For some of the possible 
consequences of subjecting proxy advisors to such regulation, see id. at 71. See also
Concept Release, supra note 129, at 121 n.287 (stating that credit rating agencies are 
subject to SEC regulation pursuant to sections 15E and 17 of the Securities 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-7, 78q-1).
219. See Lawrence J. White, A New Law for the Bond Rating Industry,
REGULATION, Spring 2007, at 48, 50 (describing the collapse of several companies 
with bonds rated as safe).
220. This was advocated in MEAGAN THOMPSON-MANN, VOTING INTEGRITY:
PRACTICE FOR INVESTORS AND THE GLOBAL PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY app. A at 
22-26 (2009), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/
millstein-center/Voting%20Integrity%20Policy%20Briefing%20No%203%2002%
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nothing wrong with such a code if the advisor firms can agree on 
one. However, additional burdens imposing higher costs would 
weigh more heavily on smaller firms,221 and forbidding firms from 
offering corporate governance advice would strike deeply at ISS but 
not at the advisors who do not offer such services. Accordingly, it 
seems unlikely that self-regulation can go very far.
CONCLUSION
Over the last few decades, the balance of power in corporate 
governance has shifted; corporate managers no longer dominate the 
process as they once did. A major reason for this change is the rise of 
proxy advisors, who have enabled institutional investors to exercise 
their shareholder franchise intelligently at a reasonable cost. 
Corporate managers resent being dethroned and have sought to 
hobble proxy advisors with various regulations. Of course, proxy 
advisors are imperfect—like all human institutions. However, on 
balance they perform a significant and beneficial role. 
The conduct of proxy advisors has also been challenged in 
Europe. The European Securities and Markets Authority inquired 
and decided against imposing new rules, although it did recommend 
that proxy advisors cooperate to develop better policies with respect 
to transparency, accuracy, and conflicts of interest.222 This is a sound 
approach. Every industry should always be encouraged to improve 
its performance, but regulation should be imposed only when the 
evidence strongly suggests that its benefits will outweigh its costs. 
The regulations proposed for proxy advisors do not meet that test.
To repeat, the supposed victims of proxy advisors’ 
shortcomings are institutional investors and their own shareholders 
or beneficiaries, and none of them are complaining. If, however, 
someone believes there are problems here, one solution would be to 
consult those shareholders.223 It is not practical that each could give 
2027%2009.pdf; see also CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS., BEST PRACTICES AND CORE 
PRINCIPLES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT, DISPENSATION, AND RECEIPT OF PROXY ADVICE
4-7 (2013), available at http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/Best-Practices-and-Core-Principles-for-Proxy-
Advisors.pdf.
221. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
222. See EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., FINAL REPORT: FEEDBACK 
STATEMENT ON THE CONSULTATION REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE PROXY ADVISORY 
INDUSTRY 3 (2013), available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2013-
84.pdf.
223. For such a proposal, see Taub, supra note 93, at 847.
1330 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1287
instructions on how her fraction of the fund’s shares should be voted 
on each of the hundreds or thousands of resolutions presented, but 
they could be given three default options: always vote with the 
issuer’s management, always vote with the fund’s proxy advisor, or 
(as is the case now) leave it to the discretion of the fund’s managers.
If most fund shareholders believe the critics of proxy advisors, 
they could instruct their fund always to vote their interest with the 
issuer’s management, and the power of the proxy advisors would be 
curbed. If, on the other hand, they believe that the fund tends to vote 
with management too often,224 they could instruct the fund always to 
vote with the proxy advisor’s recommendations. It is telling that the 
critics of proxy advisors have never advocated this approach.
224. Concerning the possible reasons for such behavior, see supra notes 91-
93 and accompanying text.
